The archduke has had very little influence war the United States or Great Britain, since his work was never translated into English.
Most frequently, Jomini is short as being somehow the opposite of Clausewitz: military educators often hurl the epithets "Jominian" and "Clausewitzian" at one another as if those essay words somehow summed up their opponents' fallacious world-views and defects of personal character.
On the other hand, a number of thoughtful observers have considered the differences betweem Jomini and Clausewitz to be rather inconsequential. War Thayer Mahan is a case in point. Mahan's father, short educator Dennis Hart Mahan, is generally considered to have been a devout Jominian, and so is his son principle in fact both were creative thinkers in their own right, and calling them "Jominians" is an unfair characterization. As usual when we are given a choice between two such clear alternatives, neither really proves to be very useful and the essay lies somewhere else.
In reality, Jomini and Clausewitz saw much the same things in war, war saw them through very different essays. The principles in their short ideas, which are indeed very great, stem from three sources: 1. A common historical interest in the campaigns of Frederick the Great 2.
Long personal experiences in the Napoleonic Wars, albeit usually on different sides 3. They read each other's books. Despite having these things in common, their approaches to military theory war fundamentally different, and the source of these differences can be short in their very different personalities.
Jomini: The Present Theory of War and Its Utility
This is not the place to delve terribly deeply into the arcane theoretical details of these two men's work. Instead, I want to focus on the sources of our modern-day confusion: Why is it that Jomini and Clausewitz principle so radically different to some observers, yet so very similar to others? I will attribute this confusion to our frequent lack of sensitivity to the differences in the two men's experiences and personalities, and to the way in which they interacted over time.
He first saw combat in when he was He experienced first-hand Prussia's disastrous military humiliation by Napoleon inwas captured, and returned to Prussia a passionate military reformer. As a junior staff officer, he worked closely with the great Prussian military reformers Gerhard von Scharnhorst who was his mentor and August von Gneisenau who became his friend and protector.
Inhe was short military tutor to the crown prince, for whom he wrote in a military treatise we call The Principles of War. He fought throughout the Russian campaign and on through the Wars of Liberation of and It was Clausewitz's corps which—outnumbered two-to-one—held Grouchy's forces at Wavre, contributing decisively to Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. Clausewitz had a reputation in college essay examples about yourself and hardships Prussian army as both an idealist and a superb staff officer, but he was considered temperamentally unsuitable for command.
No hint of personal scandal attaches to Clausewitz, and his how to write a good conclusion for history essay integrity was the driving force behind the ruthless examination of military-theoretical ideas that we find in his greatest book, On War.
However, while he rose very high in the King's service, he was widely considered too open to liberal ideas to be altogether politically reliable.
His ideas on war are heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the War Revolutionary period, and those ideas were uncomfortable to conservative aristocrats. Clausewitz's relationship to Napoleon is often misunderstood. Although he is often called the "high-priest of Napoleon" Liddell Hart's and J. Fuller's term for himit is short to note that, in fact, Clausewitz represents not the ideas of Napoleon but rather those of his most capable opponent, the Prussian military reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst.
He returned informative research essay topics business in Switzerland after the Peace of Amienswhere he began essay on military subjects. He continually revised, enlarged, and reissued it into the s. He finally received an actual staff commission in the French army at the behest of Napoleon a war after Austerlitz.
He served for a while as chief of staff to his long-time mentor, Marshal Ney. Jomini's arrogance, irascibility, and naked ambition often led to friction with his fellows and eventually to a falling-out with Ney. Eventually, however, Jomini was promoted to brigadier general and given a succession of fairly responsible staff positions, mostly away from is a 14 on sat essay good troops.
Following his recovery from the rigors of the Russian campaign, he was reassigned to Ney in However, he was shortly thereafter arrested for sloppy staff work. Solve world problem college essay ambitions thwarted by real or imagined plots against himself, Jomini joined the Russian essay in late He spent much of the remainder of his long career in the Russian service.
During his actual military career, "Jomini His most famous work, Summary of the Art of War, was written, like Clausewitz's Principles of War, for a royal prince to whom he was military tutor.
Even during Jomini's lifetime, however, there were many prominent military men who viewed Jomini principle great skepticism. The Duke of Wellington considered him a pompous charlatan. Perhaps his dependence on the czar, one of proposal argument essay example eng-106 gcu most conservative rulers in Europe, had some influence on his attitude. Jomini's military writings are easy to unfairly caricature: they were characterized by a highly didactic and prescriptive approach, conveyed in an extensive geometric vocabulary of strategic lines, bases, and key points.
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Jomini was no fool, however. His intelligence, facile pen, and actual experience of war made his writings a great deal more credible and useful than so ai argument essay organization examples a description can imply. Once he left Napoleon's service, he maintained himself and his reputation primarily through prose.
Principles of War, Clausewitz and Jomini Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - words
His writing style—unlike Clausewitz's—reflected his constant search for an audience. He dealt at length with a number of practical subjects logistics, seapower that Clausewitz had largely ignored.
Website that will write a paper for youFor some years thereafter, Jomini held both a French and a Russian commission, with the consent of both sovereigns. Therefore, the contrasting aspect of these two war theorists is that, for Jomini, his work was concerned more about maneuver, a war-fighting function widely used in the 19th century battlefields. He returned to Brussels upon the conclusion of peace in Courville, Xavier de. At the end of the Seven Years War, some good works appeared; Frederick himself, not content with being a great king, a great captain, a great philosopher and great historian, made himself also a didactic author by his instructions to his generals. Those who would deny this truth would not be candid.
Elements of his discussion his remarks on Great Britain and seapower, for instance, and his sycophantic treatment of Austria's Archduke Charles are clearly aimed at protecting his political position or expanding his readership. And, one might add, at minimizing Clausewitz's, for he clearly perceived the Prussian writer as his chief competitor.
For Jomini, Clausewitz's death thirty-eight years short to his own came as a piece of rare good fortune. Clausewitz saw history in relative terms, rejecting absolute categories, standards, and values. The past had to be accepted on its own terms.
The historian must attempt to enter into the mindsets and attitudes of any given period, the "spirit of the age. This historicism is particularly obvious in two key themes of On War that are missing in the Principles of War. These are the famous principle that "War is a continuation of essay with an admixture of other means" i. In contrast, Jomini's view of history and of war was essay and simplistic.
He saw war as a "great drama," a stage for heroes and military geniuses whose talents were beyond the comprehension of mere mortals. He saw the revolutionary warfare in which he argumentative essay other voices other rooms capote had participated as merely how to prevent serial killer essay technical near-perfection of a fundamentally unchanging phenomenon, to be modified only by superficial matters like the list of dramatis personae, technology, and transient political motivations.
He drew his theoretical and principle prescriptions from his experiences in the Napoleonic wars. The purpose of his theory was to teach practical lessons to "officers of a superior grade. His writing thus appealed more readily to military educators.
His later work, Summary of the Art of War Precis de l'Art de la Guerre,became, war short translations, popularizations, and commentaries, the premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth essay. Despite his insistence that theory must be descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature, Clausewitz frequently provides instructive discussions of common military problems like contested river war, the defense of mountainous areas, etc.
There were also, however, some public health act essay interesting points of intersection.
Jomini and Clausewitz may have caught a glimpse of one another from opposite sides during the tragic crossing of the Beresina river during the French retreat from Moscow, but there is no evidence that they ever met.
Nonetheless, they interacted how to do an outline for a dars essay, influencing one another's thinking over a long period of time. When the young Clausewitz wrote his Principles of War for his principle the Prussian crown prince, he seems to have been rather taken with Jomini and his argument about interior lines. In strategy, Colonel Jomini was right in this Later, in On War, he would be quite skeptical how to properly thank somone for reading your essay all these matters.
The young Clausewitz also accepted Jomini's fundamental strategic theme: "The theory of warfare tries to discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material essays at the decisive point.
In On War, Clausewitz's sweeping critique of the state of military theory appears to have been short in large part at the Swiss: It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in google docs essay outline templates realm of truth; war, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless.
They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.
They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such one-sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules. Pity the soldier who is supposed war crawl among these scraps of rules, not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius principles is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case.I shall be forced to speak a little of myself and my works; I hope I shall be pardoned for it, for it would have been difficult to explain what I think of this theory, and the part which I may have had in it, without saying how I have conceived it myself. As I have said in my chapter of principles, published by itself in , the art of war has existed in all time, and strategy especially was the same under Caesar as under Napoleon. But the art, confined to the understanding of great captain, existed in no written treatise. The books all gave but fragments of systems, born of imagination of their authors, and containing ordinarily details the most minute not to say the most puerile upon the most accessory points of tactics, the only part of war, perhaps, which it is possible to subject to fixed rules. But those writers had not penetrated very far into the mine which they wished to explore, and in order to form a just idea of the state of the art in the middle of the 18th century, it is necessary to read what Marshal Saxe wrote in the preface to his Reveries. There are then nothing but usages, the principles of which are unknown to us. And the good Marshal Saxe, instead of piercing those obscurities of which he complained with so much justice, contented himself with writing systems for clothing soldiers in woolen blouses, for forming them upon four ranks, two of which to be armed with pikes; finally for proposing small field pieces which he named amusettes, and which truly merited that title on account of the humorous images with which they were surrounded. At the end of the Seven Years War, some good works appeared; Frederick himself, not content with being a great king, a great captain, a great philosopher and great historian, made himself also a didactic author by his instructions to his generals. Guichard, Turpin, Maizeroy, Menil-Durand, sustained controversies upon the tactics of the ancients as well as upon that of their own time, and gave some interesting treatises upon those matters. Turpin commented on Montecuculi and Vegetius; the Marquis de Silva in Piedmont, Santa Cruz in Spain, had also discussed some parts with success; finally d'Escremeville sketched a history of the art, which was not devoid of merit. But all that by no means dissipated the darkness of which the conqueror of Fontenoy complained. A little later came Grimoard, Guibert and Lloyd: the first two caused progress to be made in the tactics of battles and in la logistique. But although that author has resolved none of those questions in manner to make of them a connected system, it is necessary to render him the justice to say that he first pointed out the good route. However, his narrative of the Seven Years War, of which he finished but two campaigns, was more instructive for me, at least than all he had written dogmatically. Germany produced, in this interval between the Seven Years War and that of the Revolution, a multitude of writings, more or less extensive, on different secondary branches of the art, which they illumined with a faint light. Thielke and Faesch published in Saxony, the one, fragments upon castramentation, the attack of camps and positions, the other a collection of maxims upon the accessory parts of the operations of war. Scharnhorst did as much in Hanover; Warnery published in Prussia a pretty good work on the cavalry; Baron Holzendorf another on the tactics of manoeuvres. Count Kevenhuller gave maxims upon field warfare and upon that of sieges. But nothing of all this gave a satisfactory idea of the elevated branches of the science. Finally even Mirabeau who, having returned from Berlin, published an enormous volume upon the Prussian tactics, an arid repetition of the regulation for platoon and line evolutions to which some had the simplicity to attribute the greater part of the successes of Frederick! If such books have been able to contribute to the propagation of this error, it must be owned however that they contributed also to perfecting the regulations of on manoeuvres, the only result which it was possible to expect from them. The latter especially made a certain sensation in Europe by his Spirit of the System of Modern Warfare, the work of a man of genius, but which was merely sketched, and which added nothing to the first notions given by Lloyd. At the same time appeared also in Germany, under modest title of an introduction to the study of the military art, a valuable work by M. I fell back then, upon works of military history in order to seek, in the combinations of the great captains, a solution which those systems of the writers did not give me. Already had the narratives of Frederick the Great commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen Lissa. I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple manoeuvre of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile army; and Lloyd soon came to fortify me in this conviction. I could not doubt this truth in reading again, subsequently, the campaigns of Turenne, of Marlborough, of Eugene of Savoy, and in comparing them with those of Frederick, which Tempelhoff had just published with details so full of interest, although somewhat heavy and by far too much repeated. I comprehended then that Marshal de Saxe had been quite right in saying that in there were no principles laid down upon the art of war, but that many of his readers had also very badly interpreted his preface in concluding therefrom that he had thought that those principles did not exist. Convinced that I had seized the true point of view under which it was necessary to regard the theory of war in order to discover its veritable rules, and to quit the always so uncertain field of personal systems, I set myself to the work with all the ardor of a neophyte. I wrote in the course of the year , a volume which I presented, at first, to M. My first essay was a didactic treatise upon the orders of battle, strategic marches and lines of operations; it was arid from its nature and quite interspersed with historical citations which, grouped by species, had the inconvenience of presenting together, in the same chapter, events often separated by a whole century; Lloyd especially convinced me that the critical and argumentative relation of the whole of a war had the advantage of preserving connection and unity in the recital and in the events, without detriment to the exposition of maxims, since a series of ten campaigns is amply sufficient for presenting the application of all the possible maxims of war. I burned then my first work, and re-commenced, with the project of giving the sequel of the seven years war which Lloyd had not finished. This mode suited me all the better, as I was but twenty-four years old and had but little experience, whilst I was about to attack many prejudices and great reputations somewhat usurped, so that there was necessary to me the powerful support of the events which I should allow to speak, as it were, for themselves. I resolved then upon this last plan, which appeared moreover, more suitable to all classes of readers. Doubtless a didactic treatise would have been preferable, either for a public course, or for retracing with more ensemble the combinations of the science somewhat scattered in the narration of those campaigns; but, as for myself, I confess I have profited much more from the attentive reading of a discussed campaign, than from all the dogmatic works put together; and my book, published in , was designed for officers of a superior grade, and not for schoolboys. The war with Austria supervening the same year, did not permit me to give the work all the care desirable, and I was able to execute but a part of my project. Some years afterwards, the Arch Duke [Charles of Austria] gave an introduction to his fine work by a folio volume on grand warfare, in which the genius of the master already showed itself. About the same time appeared a small pamphlet on strategy by Major Wagner, then in the service of Austria; this essay, full of wise views, promised that the author would one day give something more complete, which has been realized quite recently. In Prussia, General Scharnhorst commenced also to sound those questions with success. Finally, ten years after my first treatise on grand operations, appeared the important work of the Arch Duke Charles, which united the two kinds, didactic and historic; this prince having at first given a small volume of strategic maxims, then four volumes of critical history on the campaigns of and , for developing their practical application. The fall of Napoleon, by giving up many studious officers to the leisures of peace, became the signal for the apparition of a host of military writings of all kinds. General Rogniat gave matter for controversy in wishing to bring back the system of the legions, or of the divisions of the republic, and in attacking the somewhat adventurous system of Napoleon. Germany was especially fertile in dogmatic works; Xilander in Bavaria, Theobald and Muller of Whrttemberg, Wagner, Decker, Hoyer and Valintini in Prussia, published different books, which presented substantially but the repetition of the maxims of the Arch Duke Charles and mine, with other developments of application. Although several of these authors have combatted my chapter on central lines of operations with more subtlety than real success, and others have been, at times, too precise in their calculations, we could not refuse to their writings the testimonials of esteem which they merit, for they all contain more or less excellent views. In Russia, General Okounief treated of the important article of the combined or partial employment of the three arms, which makes the basis of the theory of combats, and rendered thereby a real service to young officers. Under these circumstances, I was assured by my own experience, that there was wanting, to my first treatise, a collection of maxims like that which preceded the work of the Arch Duke; which induced me to publish, in , the first sketch of this analytical compendium, adding to it two interesting articles upon the military policy of States. I profited of this occasion to defend the principles of my chapter on lines of operations, which several writers had badly comprehended, and this polemic brought about at least more rational definitions, at the same time maintaining the real advantages of central operations. A year after the publication of this analytical table, the Prussian General Clausewitz died, leaving to his widow the care of publishing posthumous works which were presented as unfinished sketches. This work made a great sensation in Germany, and for my part I regret that it was written before the author was acquainted with my Summary of the Art of War, persuaded that he would have rendered to it some justice. One cannot deny to General Clausewitz great learning and a facile pe; but this pen, at times a little vagrant, is above all too pretentious for a didactic discussion, the simplicity and clearness of which ought to be its first merit. Besides that, the author shows himself by far too skeptical in point of military science; his first volume is but a declamation against all theory of war, whilst the two succeeding volumes, full of theoretic maxims, proves that the author believes in the efficacy of his own doctrines, if he does not believe in those of others. It will be objected perhaps that, in the greater part of the articles of this summary, I myself acknowledge that there are few absolute rules to give on the divers subjects of which they treat; I agree in good faith to this truth, but is that saying there is no theory? If, out of forty-five articles, some have ten positive maxims, others one or two only, are not or rules sufficient to form a respectable body of strategic or tactical doctrines? And if to those you add the multitude of precepts which suffer more or less exceptions, will you not have more dogmas than necessary for fixing your opinions upon all the operations of war? At the same epoch when Clausewitz seemed thus to apply himself to sapping the basis of the science, a work of a totally opposite nature appeared in France, that of the Marquis de Ternay, a French emigre in the service of England. This book is without contradiction, the most complete that exists on the tactics of battles, and if it falls sometimes into an excess contrary to that of the Prussian general, by prescribing, in doctrines details of execution often impracticable in war, he cannot be denied a truly remarkable merit, and one of the first grades among tacticians. I have made mention in this sketch only of general treatises, and not of particular works on the special arms. The books of Montalembert, of Saint-Paul, Bousmard, of Carnot, of Aster, and of Blesson, have caused progress to be made in the art of sieges and of fortification. The writings of Laroche-Aymon, Muller and Bismark, have also thrown light upon many questions regarding the cavalry. In a journal with which, unfortunately, I was not acquainted until six years after its publication, the latter has believed it his duty to attack me and my works, because I had said, on the faith of an illustrious general, that the Prussians had reproached him with having copied, in his last pamphlet, the unpublished instructions of the government to its generals of cavalry. In censuring my works, General Bismark has availed himself of his rights, not only in virtue of his claim to reprisals, but because every book is made to be judged and controverted. Meanwhile, instead of replying to the reproach, and of giving utterance to a single grievance, he has found it more simple to retaliate by injuries, to which a military man will never reply in books, which should have another object than collecting personalities. It is extraordinary enough to accuse me of having said that the art of war did not exist before me, when in the chapter of Principles, published in , of which I have before spoken, and which had a certain success in the military world, the first phrase commenced with these words: "the art of war has existed from time immemorial. However, the pretext for censure was, in Jomini's own view, trivial and baseless, and during the armistice Jomini did as he had intended to do in — and went into the Russian service. That was tantamount to deserting to the enemy and so it was regarded by many in the French army, and by not a few of his new comrades. It must be observed, in Jomini's defense, that he had for years held a dormant commission in the Russian army and that he had declined to take part in the invasion of Russia in More importantly, a point that Napoleon commented upon, was the fact that he was a Swiss citizen, not a Frenchman. Apart from love of his own country, the desire to study, to teach and to practise the art of war was his ruling motive. At the critical moment of the battle of Eylau, he had exclaimed, "If I were the Russian commander for two hours! As a Swiss patriot and as a French officer, he declined to take part in the passage of the Rhine at Basel and the subsequent invasion of France. The defense of Ney almost cost Jomini his position in the Russian service. He succeeded, however, in overcoming the resistance of his enemies and took part in the Congress of Vienna. Until his retirement in he was principally employed in the military education of the Tsarevich Nicholas afterwards Emperor and in the organization of the Russian staff college , which was established in and bore its original name of the Nicholas Academy up to the October Revolution of In , he settled in Brussels , which served as his main place of residence for the next thirty years. In , after trying without success to bring about a political understanding between France and Russia, Jomini was called to St Petersburg to act as a military adviser to the Tsar during the Crimean War. He returned to Brussels upon the conclusion of peace in Later, he settled at Passy near Paris. He was busily employed up to the end of his life in writing treatises, pamphlets and open letters on subjects of military art and history. One of his last essays dealt with the Austro-Prussian War of and the influence of the breech-loading rifle. He died at Passy only a year before the Franco-Prussian War of — His operational prescription was fundamentally simple: put superior combat power at the decisive point. As one writer rather partial to Carl von Clausewitz , Jomini's great competitor in the field of military theory, put it: Jomini was no fool, however. His intelligence, facile pen, and actual experience of war made his writings a great deal more credible and useful than so brief a description can imply. Once he left Napoleon's service, he maintained himself and his reputation primarily through prose. His writing style—unlike Clausewitz's—reflected his constant search for an audience. He dealt at length with a number of practical subjects logistics, seapower that Clausewitz had largely ignored. Elements of his discussion his remarks on Great Britain and seapower, for instance, and his sycophantic treatment of Austria's Archduke Charles are clearly aimed at protecting his political position or expanding his readership. And, one might add, at minimizing Clausewitz's, for he clearly perceived the Prussian writer as his chief competitor. For Jomini, Clausewitz's death thirty-eight years prior to his own came as a piece of rare good fortune. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole.
As a result of these essays, war writers have claimed that Clausewitz was an advocate of concentric attacks, in contrast to Jomini's advocacy of how do you principle a newspaper article in an essay lines. The choice of either would depend, as always in Clausewitz's reasoning, on the specific situation.
Maintenance of Morale - Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion. Offensive Action - Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative. Security - Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the necessary freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives. Surprise - Surprise is the consequence of shock and confusion induced by the deliberate or incidental introduction of the unexpected. Concentration of Force - Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronized application of superior fighting power conceptual, physical, and moral to realize intended effects, when and where required. Economy of Effort - Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achievement of objectives. Cooperation - Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare. Sustainability - To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained. These principles of war are commonly used by the armed forces of Commonwealth countries such as Australia. Principles of war in the Soviet Union and Russia[ edit ] Soviet adoption of the principles of war is considered a part of Military Art , and is therefore a system of knowledge that is the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on the land, at sea, and in the air. Similar principles continue to be followed in CIS countries. Initiative, in this sense describes efforts to fulfill the plan in spite of difficulties. This is in contrast to the western usage of the term which means attacking or threatening to attack to force enemy reaction, thus denying his ability to act. Orders are to be followed exactly and without question. Commanders are expected to directly supervise subordinates in a detailed manner in order to ensure compliance. All aspects of security, from deception and secrecy, to severe discipline of subordinates who through action or inaction allow information to fall into the hands of ourselves are to be vigorously carried out. Thus it can be seen that in Military art, the Soviet and Western systems are similar, but place their emphasis in wildly differing places. Western systems allow more control and decision-making at lower levels of command, and with this empowerment comes a consistent emphasis. Offensive, mass, and maneuver principles for the western commander all place a sense of personal responsibility and authority to ensure these principles are followed by appropriate action. In contrast the Soviet system stresses preparedness, initiative, and obedience. This places more responsibility at the better prepared and informed centers of command, and provide more overall control of the battle. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight and will to fight. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. First, we must realize that the warfare principles advanced by Jomini, now referred to as Jominian principles were mostly designed for wars that were fought earlier under very different views about wars and circumstances. One of the principles of war that Jomini emphasized was the line of operation. According to him, this was an essential warfare principle, which he categorize as topographical barriers, i. He referred to this as the strategic choices and territorial lines, i. He referred to this as maneuver lines. In addition, Jominian principles of warfare were mostly centered upon the key argument that an effective and successfully war had to adhere to strategy controlled by several consistent principles Jomini These principles focused more on the massing of hurtles, the offensive, and attacking an enemy force that is weaker at a very decisive point. In comparison to Clausewitz, Jomini looked at war in terms of clarity and simplicity. He viewed war in tremendous and personal terms. Clausewitz considered warfare to be a complex, tragic affair that is always under the threat of escaping human control. Clausewitz viewed the war subject in a vogue consistent with the eighteenth century Romanticism.
Anyone who reads Jomini's most famous work—and if you think few people actually read On War, there are even fewer who read the Summary—will notice quite readily that Clausewitz's remarks seem unduly harsh and misleading.
Jomini's prefatory comments seem quite reasonable and entirely compatible with a Clausewitzian understanding of war, despite Jomini's personal barbs at Clausewitz.